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Rather than pursuing a dogmatic view of an ‘ideal’ European
Union, we should cultivate greater debate about the nature
of Europe and our place within it.
Blog Admin
For many, Europe appears to be on an inevitable path towards greater integration and
federalism, with the UK looking more and more for a way out of the EU. Simon
Glendinning takes an in-depth look at the philosophical underpinnings of the contemporary
debate over European integration, arguing against those who take a ‘dogmatic’ view of the
march towards an idealised federal union. Instead, he writes, we should resist these
harmonising ambitions and work towards ‘unity in diversity’: a Europe whose peoples have
the freedom to debate and choose their own ends.
In a recent article in the Telegraph, Peter Oborne draws the debates over Britain’s f uture in the European
Union into relation to an age-old philosophical quarrel: “The problem is that European and Brit ish leaders
tend to come f rom rival intellectual tradit ions”:
“In Britain, empiricism – most closely associated with Hume, though its roots can be traced
back to William of Ockham and others – is the native inheritance. Empiricism insists that all
knowledge of fact must be based on experience. Most European schools of philosophy claim
the exact opposite, namely that ideas are the only things that truly exist. This school of
metaphysical idealism can be traced back through Hegel (for whom history itself is the
realisation of an idea) and Kant to Plato. Anglo-Saxon empiricism and the idealism found on
the Continent therefore prescribe directly opposite courses of political conduct.”
Oborne’s attempt to align contemporary European polit ics with tradit ional European philosophy is
f ascinating. And while I don’t think his distinction between empiricists and idealists will do the trick, I do
think that signif icant philosophical dif f erences are lurking behind polit ical disputes around Europe today.
First, a correction. The distinction Oborne draws between a Brit ish “empiricist” tradit ion and a Continental
“idealist” one mixes up two standard distinctions in philosophy. Empiricism is usually opposed to
rationalism. This is a distinction in epistemology concerning the f oundations of  knowledge. And idealism
is usually opposed to materialism. This is a distinction in ontology concerning the f undamental nature of
reality.
The distinction between empiricists
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The distinction between empiricists
and rationalists is a good one, and
there is some justif ication f or thinking
the f ormer is more commonly f ound in
Brit ish philosophy and the latter more
commonly in French and German
philosophy. The distinction between
idealists and materialists is also a
good one, but it is not clear that this
lines up philosophical nationalit ies at
all. Hegel is a paradigm idealist, Marx a
paradigm materialist, both are German.
However, there is another
philosophical distinction hovering
around Oborne’s mixing things up, and
this one is exceptionally important f or
thinking about dif f erent approaches to
European union today, though like the
distinction in ontology it is not clear
that it f ollows nationally conf igured contours. I will give labels at the end, but f or the moment will describe
the distinction without them.
The distinction at issue grows f rom rival European views of  human history. Both of  these views
understand the trajectory of  world history as involving a transit ion f rom a primitive condition to an
increasingly civilised one. However, one of  these views regards that transit ion as having a universal
appropriateness f or humanity: the process of  civilisation is understood in terms of  progressive
advances in learning how to live together that move societies ever closer to an ideal f orm of  individual
and social lif e f or Man.
In his essay “Two Concepts of  Liberty”, Isaiah Berlin draws a distinction between those who hold this
kind of  view of  history and those who f ind such grand narratives of  emancipation and progress both
unbelievable and dangerous. The f ormer group (and Berlin does not divide Europe or even the West on
this, and includes here “German historicists or French theocrats, or neo-Conservatives in English-
speaking countries”) can be said to be inclined towards what Berlin calls a “metaphysical view of  polit ics”
because their views are governed by an a priori idea of  Man and the proper end of  Man. The latter group,
by contrast, are those who hold what Berlin calls an “empirical view of  polit ics,” claiming to take men as
they f ind them. On the empirical view, Berlin suggests, we come to see that “the ends of  men are many,
and not all of  them are in principle compatible with each other.” A thinker who subscribes to this view will
conclude that “the possibility of  conf lict – and of  tragedy – can never wholly be eliminated f rom human
lif e, either personal or social.”
Those who hold an empirical view of  polit ics thus deny that there is an ideal arrangement of  human
af f airs. Instead, they urge us to heed “Burke’s plea f or the constant need to compensate, to reconcile,
to balance; and Mill’s plea f or novel ‘experiments in living’ with their permanent possibility of  error.” Berlin
is aware that this sort of  view “may madden those who seek f or f inal solutions and single, all-embracing
systems, guaranteed to be eternal.” Nevertheless, he is convinced that “it is a conclusion that cannot be
escaped by those who, with Kant, have learnt the truth that ‘Out of  the crooked timber of  humanity no
straight thing was ever made’.”
At issue, then, is a distinction between those who hold that there is a universally ideal condition f or man,
and so insist on a “monism of  values,” and those who see in experience many ends of  men, and so insist
on accepting a “pluralism of  values.” Thinkers of  the latter sort do not have to give up on ideas of
emancipation and progress, nor the idea of  more and less historically primitive f orms of  human society.
Nevertheless, they will not see these things in terms of  a historical movement of  Man towards a f inal end
of  history. Berlin concludes:
“It may be that the ideal of freedom to choose ends without claiming eternal validity for them,
and the pluralism of values connected with this, is only the late fruit of our declining capitalist
civilisation: an ideal which remote ages and primitive societies have not recognised, and one
which posterity will regard with curiosity, even sympathy, but little comprehension. This may
be so; but no skeptical conclusions seem to me to follow. Principles are not less sacred
because their duration cannot be guaranteed….‘To realise the relative validity of one’s
convictions,’ said an admirable writer of our time, ‘and yet stand for them unflinchingly is what
distinguishes a civilised man from a barbarian.’ To demand more than this is perhaps a deep
and incurable metaphysical need; but to allow it to determine one’s practice is a symptom of
an equally deep, and more dangerous, moral and political immaturity.”
It is in these terms – and on Berlin’s side – that I think we should approach the philosophical distinction
underlying Oborne’s discussion of  European quarrels. It is not a contrast between idealists and
empiricists, but a distinction between two ways of  rejecting scepticism about values: between those, on
the one hand, who cleave to an ideal in which everyone is f ree to make his or her own “experiment in
living,” and those, on the other hand, who cleave to an ideal of  a single and f inally adequate f orm of
individual and social lif e f or Man. The contrasts here are, to give them nicely post-Kantian names,
between Skeptics, Experimenters and Dogmatists.
How might this trinity of  posit ions be applied to European polit ics today? The contemporary French
Maoist philosopher Alain Badiou is a polemical Dogmatist, insisting that human societies must always be
“measured” against a single “principle of  principles”; namely “the principle of  equality.” However, I think all
sides in the European debate might agree with Badiou that the f undamental problem f acing today’s
European f ramework is that it lacks “popular impetus” and is “without subjective f orce”; it is not – except
perhaps in the small world of  the Brussels’ bubble – run through with personal commitments and
attachments. Moreover, I think all sides might also agree with Badiou’s sense that, beyond Europe’s
objective situation in global af f airs, it is f inally “that subjectivity that interests us, that solicits us.” The
question then is how to respond to that solicitation. Does it demand today the sort of  “great creative
gesture” that Dogmatists like Badiou wish f or, in his case “the f using of  Germany and France into a new
unity”? Or, is it imperative today precisely to resist this sort of  “great creative gesture”?
On this point Skeptics and Experimenters are at one against Dogmatists. Dogmatists are those who
understand “ever closer union” in Europe as a movement towards the radical elimination of  “conf lict and
tragedy” through the approximation of  European society to an ideal f orm of  social lif e f or all humanity: a
cosmopolitan polit ical project with a rationally ideal end, viz. the f inal “f usion” of  states. Skeptics about
European union resist this because they think that the absence of  “subjective f orce” behind the
European project is more or less inevitable: the “subjectivity that interests us” resides primarily in the
rootedness of  people in nations, and there is no prospect nor any advantage in seeking to f orge a
polit ical unit beyond that f orm. Experimenters resist the harmonizing ambitions of  the Dogmatists too.
However, unlike Skeptics, they cleave to an ideal around which a not-merely-national “we” might f orm,
and, today, will contribute to discussions concerning “ever closer union” among European peoples in
these terms. For Experimenters, what we need to move towards is a Europe to come that ‘stands
unf linchingly’ f or the ideal of  f reedom to choose our own ends (including all sorts of  collective ends at
dif f erent levels); a condition where people increasingly f eel themselves the author of  their own lives
rather than subjected, in imperious f ashion, to Dogmatic ideals of  a single end f or all.
How the Experimenter ’s point of  view might inf orm work dedicated to EU multi- level institutional design is
a f ascinating question – and one that is way beyond this piece. However, we might still ask whether there
is a “great creative gesture” comparable to Badiou’s call f or the f usion of  Germany and France that might
give impetus to the Experimenter ’s cause. In the 1920s and 30s the French poet and thinker Paul Valéry
called f or something of  this sort in the context of  the development of  the League of  Nations. In his
contributions Valéry insisted that an organ of  international co-operation cannot depend only on the work
of  minds especially dedicated to government. It needs in addition the co-operation of  “minds especially
dedicated to the mind”: not just co-operation between people who work on treaties and constitutions, but
also among people who work on our self -understanding, our understanding of  who we are.
The goal here is not the achievement of  a single European mind that will help draf t some f uture single
European act. As an Experimenter Valéry insists that the point is precisely not “to establish among minds
the harmony of  unif ormity”. Far f rom it: “That [unif ormity] would doubtless be monotonous, and certainly
undesirable. It is right that ideas should dif f er according to men, their ages, conditions, and
surroundings, and there is more than one art of  thinking. This very variety is a natural and necessary
condition of  vitality.” On the other hand, Valéry did not think, as a Skeptic might, that such dif f erences are
rooted in national tradit ions that create insurmountable “obstacles” to a developing harmony: they do not
need to “harden in isolation and become inaccessible to exchange.”
Cultivating this condition of  harmony without harmonisation in Europe is, surely, as close as one could
wish f or the idea of  “unity in diversity” that the European project has always put at the f oreground of  its
movement of  “ever closer union among the peoples [plural] of  Europe”. If  we want to move towards the
kind of  League of  Nations in Europe that Experimenters since Kant have anticipated, we do not need
“polemics” on “the only rational steps” towards the f usion of  states, but the development across our
continent of  f orms of  “correspondence” and “exchange” that can f orge a new “Republic of  Letters.”
Valéry concludes: ‘The League of  Nations presupposes a league of  minds.”
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